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Abstract
Grandparents are regular providers of free child care. Similar to any other form
of child care, availability of grandparent-provided child care affects fertility and la-
bor market decisions of women positively. We find that women in Germany, residing
close to parents or in-laws are more likely to have children and that as mothers they
are more likely to hold a regular part-or fulltime job. However, different from any
other type of child care, for individuals to enjoy grandparent-provided child care
on a regular basis, residence choices must coincide with those of parents or in-laws.
Thus while living close provides access to free child care, it imposes costly spatial re-
strictions. We find that hourly wages of mothers residing close to parents or in-laws
are lower compared to those residing further away, and having relatives taking care
of ones’ children increases the probability of having to commute. We build a gen-
eral equilibrium model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor force
participation that can account for the relationships between grandparent-provided
child care, fertility and labor market outcomes. We simulate our model to analyze
how women’s decisions regarding residence, fertility, and labor force participation
change under different family policies.
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1 Introduction
Grandparents are an important source of child care. According to data from the 2nd
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), between 23%
(Denmark) and 70% (Italy) of grandparents take care of their grandchildren age ten or
younger on a daily or weekly basis. In the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland more
than 40% of grandparents take care of their small grandchildren each week, while in Italy,
Greece, and Poland more than 40% of grandparents provide daily care for grandchildren
age ten or younger (see Figure 1.1).1 The availability of child care and especially cheap or
even costless child care has important effects on fertility and mothers’ labor force partic-
ipation. This is important, because while female labor force participation has increased
tremendously over the last decades, mothers are still participating significantly less than
other women.
Figure 1.1: Grandparent-Provided Care for Children ≤ 10 years
Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
There exists an extensive empirical literature that has studied the link between female
labor force participation and child care. Many papers propose a joint analysis of the effect
of child care costs on fertility and labor force participation. For Italy, Del Boca [2002]
1In the US, 22.7% of children under 5 years are regularly cared for by their grandparents (Overturf
Johnson [2005]).
shows that both the availability of child care and the possibility of part time work increase
labor force participation and fertility. Blau and Robins [1989] establish a similar pattern
for the US. Within the context of already high female participation rates in Sweden, Mo-
erck et al [2009] is one of the few papers that focuses exclusively on the effect of child
care costs on fertility. In a literature summary, Del Boca and Viuri [2007] point out that
most studies find that high child care costs deter female labor supply, while availability
of child care has a positive effect on labor force participation by mothers. Thus these
findings suggest that the main barrier that mothers face at the time of working is to
obtain affordable child care (e.g. child care costs in the US amount to 30% of the income
of a family living below the poverty line).2
In this sense, free grandparent-provided child care seems to be the perfect solution for
working mothers. However, in order to enjoy grandparent-provided child care on a regular
basis, residence choices of adult children and elderly parents have to coincide. Data from
the 2nd wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) shows
that the frequency of grandparent-provided child care is clearly linked to the geographical
distance between caregivers and caretakers. Figure 1.2 displays the geographical distance
between grandparents and their small grandchildren (younger than 10 years) together
with the frequency of care provided, for Italy, Spain, Germany, and Denmark. As already
suggested in Figure 1.1, the overall frequency of care varies strongly across the four se-
lected countries, with Italian and Spanish grandparents clearly providing child care more
frequently than German or Danish grandparents. However, similar across all countries,
those who provide more frequent care tend to live close by.3
Hence, while grandparent-provided child care may induce positive effects on fertility and
mothers’ labor force participation, different from any other type of child care, it imposes
spatial restrictions that might affect labor market outcomes negatively. In this paper we
document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking at German data
we find that women residing close to parents or in-laws are more likely to have children
and as mothers they are more likely to hold a regular full-or part time job. However, their
wages are lower and they are more likely to commute. We then build a general equilibrium
model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female labor force participation that can
account for the relationships between grandparent-provided child care, fertility and labor
market outcomes. We simulate our model to analyze how women’s decisions regarding
residence, fertility, and labor force participation change under different family policies.
2US Census Bureau [2011].
3The same pattern can be observed across the rest of the countries included in the SHARE data set;
see Figures A-1-A-3 of the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
The current paper thus contributes to the literature by being the first paper, to the best of
our knowledge, that explicitly incorporates spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-
provided child care into a general equilibrium model of fertility and labor force participa-
tion decisions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is also the first one to document
both costs and benefits of the geographical proximity between parents and adult children
implied by grandparent-provided child care. The existing literature, on the contrary, has
solely highlighted the positive implications of geographical proximity between parents and
adult children. Holdswoth and Dale [2009] study labor force participation of mothers in
Spain and Britain and estimate that for Spanish women whose parents live in the same
town (’municipio’) the probability of being in employment is 1.24 times higher than for
those who do not live close to their parents. For the US, Compton and Pollak [2011] us-
ing proximity as an instrument for child care transfers, estimate labor force participation
of mothers to be 5.1 to 6.2 percentage points higher if their mothers or mothers-in-law
take care of their children. Studying fertility intentions rather than outcomes Raymo et
al [2010] find that Italian and Japanese women living close to their parents have higher
fertility intentions.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational transfers. The majority
of this literature focuses mainly on two aspects: (i) monetary transfers in terms of be-
quests from parents to children and (ii) time transfers in terms of care from children to
elderly parents. One interesting paper regarding the latter aspect that also incorporates
residence choices is Konrad et al [2002]. The authors develop a game theoretical model
of strategic choice of residence among siblings who try to avoid having to take care of
elderly parents. Looking at German data, they find support for their model’s predictions
of older siblings locating further away from their parents than younger siblings. With a
similar approach in mind, Stern [1995] estimates care choices of elderly parents together
with location decisions of children. His work is closely related to the current paper as he
also takes into account how the child’s location decision affects his or her work decision.
Some of the few empirical works that consider time transfers from parents to children
in form of grandparent-provided child care is Dimova and Wolff [2011] who look at data
from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and find a posi-
tive effect on the extensive margin of female labor force participation but no effect along
the intensive margin. For Italy, Arpino et al [2010] find that grandparent-provided child
care increases, in particular labor force participation of low educated mothers of young
children. Other authors such as Smith Koslowski [2009] have focused on the costs that
grandparent-provided child care implies for grandparents.
With this in mind, Cardia and Ng [2003] explicitly incorporate grandparents’ decisions
into a general equilibrium model for grandparent-provided child care. The authors sug-
gests that subsidizing grandparents’ time to be the most effective policy in terms of output
and capital accumulation. However, different from the current paper, the authors do not
consider the spatial restrictions and potential costs in terms of labor market outcomes im-
plied by grandparent-provided child care. Both papers, that we view as complementary,
are also part of the literature that uses general equilibrium models to assess how different
public policies interact with family decisions.4 Greenwood, Guner and Knowles [2000] for
instance, investigate the effect of the rise in the generosity of welfare payments on the
rising incidence of single motherhood while Garc´ıa-Mora´n [2010] evaluates the effect of
child care subsidies on female labor force participation, fertility and children’s educational
levels. She finds that child care subsidies promote employment, fertility and education,
especially for children in single parent households. Erosa, Fuster and Restuccia [2010]
develop a model of fertility choice and labor market decisions to account for the observed
gender differences in job attachment, employment and earnings. Their aim is to provide
a framework to study the interactions of fertility choice and labor market turnover in
4See Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos [2010] or Guner and Knowles [2009] among others.
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the determination of employment and wages. They argue that having this framework is
important for the evaluation of family policies. Our aim is similar to these papers, as
within a general equilibrium framework we assess the effects of different family policies
on women’s decisions regarding residence, fertility, and labor force participation and we
analyze how these decisions affect their labor market outcomes in the presence of spa-
tial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care. However, for the sake of
tractability we abstain from several features present in the papers mentioned, such as
a marriage market or employers’ demand for labor.5 Also related to this paper are the
works by Bick [2010] and Mendez [2008]. Within a life cycle model, the former analyzes
data for Germany and concludes that informal child care (by relatives) plays an impor-
tant role given that mothers’ labor force participation exceeds child care enrollment for
children up to 2 years. However, different from the current paper the author does not
model relative-provided child care nor does he take into account the spatial restrictions
that it imposes. The paper by Mendez [2008] on the other hand attempts to account for
differences in geographical mobility and female labor force participation across European
countries. Similar to the current paper, the author provides a model of residence choice,
fertility and female labor force participation. However, different from the current paper
regions in his model only differ in terms of child care arrangements and hence there is no
cost associated to living close to parents or in-laws.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our em-
pirical analysis. Section 3 presents the general equilibrium model. Section 4 describes
our calibration strategy and Section 5 presents the results of the paper. In Section 6
we describe the mechanisms at work in greater detail and we perform two counterfactual
experiments in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we consider data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). The GSOEP is an annual household survey that has been carried out since
1984. The first sample in 1984 included 5,921 households with 16,205 individuals (76%
adults, 24% children) of which 44% still remained in the sample in 2004, after 20 years.
In addition, new samples for refreshment of the data and for specifically targeting certain
groups of the population (East Germans, foreigners, high-income individuals) were added
in 1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The GSOEP provides extensive information
5However, these features could be included in future analysis.
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on individuals’ labor market participation, marital and family status, wages, education,
the size of the town they live in etc.6 For our analysis we only consider women age 25 to
50 living in Germany. We exclude those born outside of Germany, given that for these
individuals both key variables of our analysis, (i) availability of child care by relatives and
(ii) residence relative to parents, might be determined by very different aspects compared
to individuals who were born in Germany. Given stark differences in mothers’ labor force
participation rates between East and West Germany, we introduce dummy variables to
distinguish between individuals living in East and West Germany.7 To account for possi-
ble cultural differences, we also distinguish among those of German nationality and those
of other nationalities. We define three levels of education following the International Stan-
dard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) designed by the UNESCO[1997]. These
levels correspond to (i) primary education (ISCED levels 0 and 1), (ii) secondary education
(ISCED levels 2, 3, and 4 ), and (iii) tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6). Town sizes
are grouped into small communities (up to 20.000 inhabitants), medium-sized communi-
ties (20.000-100.000 inhabitants), and large communities (more than 100.000 inhabitants).
For our empirical analysis we make use of two alternative ways of measuring the effect of
grandparent-provided child care. The first one is an indirect measure that consists of the
variables ’where does mother live’ and ’where does father live’. However, only during four
waves of the survey (1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006) were participants asked to categorize
their parents’ relative residence as in: i)the same house, ii)the same neighborhood, iii)the
same town, iv)another town but within one hour by car, v)further away, or vi)in a foreign
country. Thus, for our analysis we use an unbalanced sample of individuals with informa-
tion on the relative residence of parents or in-laws and we pool observations from these
four waves.8 We construct a dummy variable “parents or in-laws close” that takes on
value one for individuals whose mother, father, or in-law lives in the same neighborhood
or town and another dummy variable “parents or in-laws far” for individuals who live
more than one hour or further away from their parents or in-laws. For individuals who
live in the same house as their parents or in-laws we construct a different dummy variable
“parents or in-laws in same house”, given that this particular form of co-residence often
arises because young individuals still live at home or due to the need for intensive care
of parents and in most cases it represents a temporary living arrangement. This indirect
6For more details on the GSOEP and its development, see SOEP [2005].
7Labor force participation rates for East German mothers of small children (0-3 years) have tradition-
ally been very high and even today they continue to be around 15 percentage points higher than rates
for West German mothers (Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [2005].) In our
first sample, labor force participation rates for mothers are 64% and 47% respectively in East and West
Germany.
8For 1991, we exclude individuals living in East Germany given that in this particular wave information
for most labor market variables (participation, wages) are missing for East Germans.
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measure reflects more than actually provided child care by grandparents. If living close
to parents or in-laws before having children affects fertility decisions, this measure might
also reflect “potentially” provided child care and thus would prove particularly useful to
test effects on fertility. On the other hand, if individuals continue to live close to parents
or in-laws after children have grown beyond the child care age, the measure might reflect
“child care provided in the past”, which could be useful to test effects on current wages.
Our second measure is a more direct one and uses the variable ’regular child care by rel-
atives’. While this includes child care by any relative, grandparent-provided child care is
the most common form of relative-provided child care and even for child care by relatives
other than grandparents similar spatial restrictions apply. The variable ’regular child care
by relatives’, on the other hand is only available for the waves: 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. For our analysis we focus on individuals with children age
three and younger and again we pool data from the available waves. We consider mothers
of children age three and younger, given that in Germany availability of public or publicly
subsidized nursery for children of age three and older is almost guaranteed, while for those
younger very few places are available.9 Hence child care by relatives is particularly impor-
tant for mothers of children age three and younger. We thus construct a dummy variable
“child care by relatives” that takes on value one for all mothers with children age three
or younger if relatives regularly take care of this child. Another dummy variable “child
care nursery” takes on value one if the child of age three and younger is attending nursery
school. From both of our samples we exclude individuals with incomplete or inconsistent
information.10 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide summary statistics for both samples, for both
women and mothers.
Description of the sample Our first sample consists of 10,732 women and 8,129
mothers. In the second sample we have information for 27,810 women and 3,390 mothers
of children age three or younger.
9According to data from the Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder [2011], in 2011 only around
15% of children age three and younger in care attended public or publicly subsidized nurseries, while 85%
attended some form of private day care, compared to less than 1% of children between three and six.
10Hence, from both of our samples we exclude those who report to have worked regular full-or part
time jobs but who also report to have worked fewer than twenty hours a month. For our first sample we
exclude individuals who report to work regular full-or part time jobs but do not report their wage income
or firm tenure or report zero or negative values for any of the two variables. For our second sample this
exclusion criteria concerns those who report to work regular full-or part time jobs and who do not answer
the question if they work and reside in the same town.
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Table 2.1: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample-
- 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006-
First Sample: Women 25-50 Mothers 25-50
Age 37.43 (7.09) 38.80 (6.58)
25-29 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
30-34 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39)
35-39 0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43)
40-44 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.42)
45-50 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42)
Married, living together 0.68 (0.46) 0.79 (0.40)
Other than German nationality 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12)
Children 0.76 (0.43) 1 (0)
Children 0-3 0.17 (0.37) 0.22 (0.42)
Primary education 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
Secondary education 0.72 (0.45) 0.73 (0.44)
Tertiary education 0.27 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44)
Regular fulltime job 0.36 (0.48) 0.25 (0.43)
Regular part time job 0.24 (0.43) 0.29 (0.45)
Small community 0.45 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
Medium community 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
Large community 0.29 (0.46) 0.26 (0.44)
in West Germany 0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45)
in East Germany 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34)
Parents or in-laws close 0.42 (0.49) 0.44 (0.50)
- Parents or in-laws in same neighborhood 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41)
- Parents or in-laws in same town 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42)
Parents or in-laws far away 0.44 (0.50) 0.43 (0.49)
- Parents or in-laws one hour away 0.29 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45)
- Parents or in-laws further away 0.15 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34)
Parents or in-laws in foreign country 0.005 (0.07) 0.005 (0.07)
Spouse’s income* 2844.46 (2361.99) 2865.04 (2159.02)
Hourly wage** 12.36 (6.22) 12.05 (6.21)
Tenure in firm** 8.40 (7.33) 8.89 (7.56)
N 10,732 8,129
*Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 7, 323, N = 6, 083 for mothers) **Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs
(N = 6, 471 ,N = 4, 348 for mothers)
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Table 2.2: Means (Std.) - GSOEP pooled sample -
-1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006-
Second Sample: Women 25-50 Mothers 25-50
of children age ≤ 3
Age 38.09 (7.14) 33.06 (4.40)
25-29 0.15 (0.36) 0.23 (0.43)
30-34 0.18 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49)
35-39 0.21 (0.41) 0.28 (0.45)
40-44 0.22 (0.41) 0.08 (0.27)
45-50 0.23 (0.42) 0.005 (0.07)
Married, living together 0.66 (0.47) 0.80 (0.40)
Other than German nationality 0.02 (0.15) 0.05 (0.20)
Children 0.75 (0.43) 1 (0)
Children 0-3 0.16 (0.37) 1 (0)
Primary education 0.01 (0.10) 0.008 (0.09)
Secondary education 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45)
Tertiary education 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.45)
Regular fulltime job 0.35 (0.48) 0.07 (0.25)
Regular part time job 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.34)
Small community 0.48 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50)
Medium community 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44)
Large community 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
in West Germany 0.74 (0.44) 0.77 (0.42)
in East Germany 0.26 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42)
Children in Nursery - 0.46 (0.50)
Children cared for by relatives - 0.34 (0.47)
Spouse’s income* 3122.98 (2259.43) 3126.92 (1853.81)
Tenure in firm** 8.68 (7.61) 7.11 (5.41)
Job in town** 0.39 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49)
N 27,810 3,390
*Only taking into account strictly positive income (N = 17, 544, N = 2, 581 for mothers)**Among those working regular part-or fulltime jobs
(N = 16, 343 N = 690, for mothers)
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Both samples only include women between 25 and 50, with an average age of 38 years.
With an average age of around 33 years, mothers in our second sample are slightly younger
given that in this sample we only consider mothers of children age three and younger. We
construct five different age groups, each containing about one fifth of women in both
samples. Given average late birth, the first age group in our first sample only contains
about one tenth of all mothers, while in our second sample that only considers mothers
of children age three and younger less than 1% are older than 44. Around two thirds of
women and 80% of mothers in both samples are married and around 1-5% has a nation-
ality different from the German one. Approximately 75% of women between 25 and 50
in both samples have children and around 20% are mothers of small children (age 0-3).
Among both mothers and women, around 1% has only completed primary education, 72%
finished secondary education, and around 27% completed tertiary education. For moth-
ers this last percentage is slightly lower, while a larger fraction of mothers has completed
secondary education.11
Around 35% of women have a regular fulltime job and 25% hold a regular part time job.
For mothers in our first sample both percentages are similar of around 25% and 29%
respectively. In our second sample that only considers mothers of children age three and
younger 7% work regular fulltime jobs while 14% hold a regular part time job. More
women live in small communities than in medium sized or large communities. The large
majority (72-77%) of women and mothers in both samples lives in West Germany. Around
43% of women and mothers in the sample live in the same neighborhood or town as their
parents or in-laws, while 13% live in the same house or household and around 44% live
at least one hour away from their parents or in-laws. Almost half of all mothers in our
second sample use nursery care for their children age three and younger, while a little
over one third has their children cared for by relatives on a regular basis. Considering
only those women or mothers whose spouse has a strictly positive income, the average
monthly spouse’s income is around 3000AC.12 Hourly wages of women and mothers are
around 12AC. On average, these individuals have been with their current employer for the
last 7 to 9 years. Around 40% of women and mothers work and reside in the same town.
11Given few women and mothers who only completed primary education, for our estimations we group
those having completed primary and secondary education and only differentiate between women with
and without tertiary education.
12Note that when pooling the sample we only adjust wages for the change from Deutschmark to Euro.
We do not adjust for wage growth, given stagnant real hourly net wages in Germany between 1991 and
2006 (see Figure 1 in DIW [2009]).
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Proximity to Parents and Fertility For women living in the same neighborhood or
town as their parents or in-laws the probability to have children is around 4 percentage
points higher compared to women living further away. Table 2.3 displays marginal effects
from the probit estimation for the probability of having children. Controlling for marital
status, spouse’s income, region of residence, the size of the community, age, year effects,
and education, geographical proximity to potential grandparents has a significantly pos-
itive effect on fertility. Concerning the other variables of the regression, the likelihood
of being a mother for women in Germany between 25 and 50 is clearly positively influ-
enced by their marital status. Being married raises the probability of having children by
almost 30 percentage points. Furthermore, higher spouse’s income and living in East Ger-
many and in a small community increases the probability while higher education reduces
the probability as does living in a large community, relative to living in a medium-sized
community. Including an interaction term between living close to parents or in-laws and
educational attainment into the regression, we find that the positive effect of living close
to parents or in-laws on women’s fertility is particularly strong for women with university
education.13
Proximity to Parents, Child Care by Relatives and Participation of Mothers
For our estimations regarding labor force participation we only consider a woman in the
labor force if she works a regular part-or fulltime job. The probability to hold a regular
part-or fulltime job for mothers residing close to their parents or in-laws is 3 percentage
points higher compared to mothers residing further away. The first column of Table 2.4
displays the marginal effects from a probit regression for the probability of having a regular
part-or fulltime job in Germany for mothers age 25 to 50.
In addition to the control variables of the first regression, we also include a dummy vari-
able that indicates if the mother has a small child (age 0 to 3). The probability of holding
a regular part-or fulltime job decreases strongly in the presence of a small child, decreases
with marriage, and increases with tertiary education compared to primary or secondary
education. The probability that a mother is working is lower for those of a foreign na-
tionality, it is higher if she is residing in East Germany and it also increases with her age,
because mothers age jointly with their children and older children facilitate mothers’ labor
force participation. Higher spouse’s income is associated positively to mothers’ labor force
participation. While higher spouse’s income relaxes the household’s budget constraint and
thus allows a mother to stay home, many of those married to men of higher income are
high-skilled women (assortative matching) for whom staying home implies higher forgone
13See Table A.1 of the Appendix. Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial
for age instead of age group dummies as well as to including years of education instead of educational
categories. Given that marital status and spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents
or in-laws we also check consistency of results, excluding both variables (see Table A.2 of the Appendix).
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Table 2.3: Effect of close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
Married, living together 0.287*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.007 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.153*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.041*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.002 (0.013)
Small community 0.029*** (0.010)
Large community -0.060*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Probit Estimation; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06;
Women 25-50. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried women age 25-29 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2
(ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
wages. Here the latter effect seems to dominate the former. Living in the same house
with parents or in-laws has a stronger effect on mother’s labor force participation than
simply living close by. This result might be due to the fact that if living in the same
house as parents or in-laws is due to the need for intensive care for parents or represents a
temporary living arrangement this might detain women from having children. However,
for women who have decided to become mothers, living in the same house as parents or
in-laws is probably not related to this type of situation. On the contrary, for mothers hav-
ing parents or in-laws as close as possible facilitates their participation in the labor market.
We obtain stronger results for our alternative analysis that uses the more direct measure
’child care by relatives’ (see column two of Table 2.4). For mothers of children age three
and younger, having relatives taking care of their child increases chances of holding a
regular full-or part time job by around 15 percentage points, an effect much stronger than
that caused by having the child attending a nursery school, associated to an increase of 9
percentage points. Hence, the net effect of relative-provided child care on the probability
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Table 2.4: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Mothers’ Participation
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers’ Labor Force Participation
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Children 0-3 -0.373*** (0.015)
Married, living together -0.137*** (0.017) -0.062*** (0.021)
Other than German nationality -0.127** (0.053) -0.070** (0.031)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.007*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
in East Germany 0.126*** (0.014) 0.106*** (0.020)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.173*** (0.013) 0.075*** (0.017)
Parents or in-laws close 0.029** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.034* (0.018)
Children cared for
by relatives 0.155*** (0.016)
Children in nursery 0.090*** (0.014)
Small community -0.005 (0.014) -0.014 (0.017)
Large community 0.017 (0.016) 0.029 (0.019)
Observations 8,129 3,390
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 1) 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4)
in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West Germany, far from parents or in-laws, with children older than 3. 2) 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06;
Mothers (25-50) of children <= 3 years. Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4),
in a medium-sized town in West Germany, with children age 0-3 who are not in nursery nor cared for by relatives. All regressions
include, year dummies and age group dummies.
of holding a regular part-or fulltime job is given by the difference of 6 percentage points.14
For this alternative estimation, marginal effects of all other variables on the probability
of holding a regular part-or fulltime job are similar, with the exception of the coefficient
for spouse’s income not being significant.15
14This number lies in the range of values estimated by Compton and Pollak [2011] for the US of 5.1 to
6.2 percentage points.
15All estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group
dummies as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. Marital status and
spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws, and having a child in a nursery
may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results to the
exclusion of these variables (see Table A.3 of the Appendix). Including interaction terms for living close
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Proximity to Parents and Wages While grandparent-provided child care seems to be
a way to promote fertility and mothers’ labor force participation, the required proximity
to one’s parents or in-laws may imply a cost given the spatial restrictions it imposes on
one’s potential labor market. In order to study the possible negative effect of living close
to parents or in-laws on wage incomes of mothers we consider wage incomes of dependent
workers of regular full-or part time jobs.16 Controlling for selection effects, we find that
mothers living close to their parents or in-laws earn significantly lower hourly wages. The
first column of Table 2.3 displays the coefficients for the Heckman selection model for log
hourly wages for mothers in Germany age 25 to 50.
While living close to parents or in-laws or in the same house with them increases the
probability of holding a regular part-or fulltime job, it reduces hourly wages by 5%.17
Concerning the other variables and controlling for selection effects (see column two of
Table 2.5), hourly wages in Germany of mothers between 25 and 50 are higher for those
living in large communities and they increase with firm tenure, each additional year in-
creases hourly wages by 1.6%. In addition, having tertiary education rather than primary
or secondary education increases hourly wages by around 30%. On the other hand, living
in small communities, not being German and living in East Germany are all aspects that
negatively influence hourly wages.18
Proximity to Parents and Commutes Lower wages are just one way in which costs of
spatial restrictions may become apparent. Other costs may arise from longer commutes,
as suggested by Rupert et al [2009] who looking at French data find that mothers in
particular with small children who have low bargaining power as workers incur in longer
commuting times. We find that for working mothers of children age three and younger
to parents and education, or child care by relatives and education does not change results and coefficients
of these terms turn out to not be statistically significant.
16The effect of spatial restrictions on wages is best measured by “parents or in-laws close”, more so
than by the fact if children are actually cared for by grandparents, because an effect on wages might be
long-lasting even after children are grown up given that initial wages can condition future wages. This
consideration together with the fact that our second sample only includes mothers of children age three
and younger of which only 21% work regular part-or fulltime jobs (see Table 2.2) is the reason why we
use our first indirect measure of grandparent-provided child care to measure the effect on wages.
17Log monthly wages, controlled for by hours worked, show a slightly higher discount for living close
(see Table A.4 of the Appendix) as does not controlling for selection (see Table A.5 of the Appendix for
an OLS regression of log hourly wages).
18 Estimation results are consistent to the inclusion of a polynomial for age instead of age group dum-
mies as well as to including years of education instead of educational categories. Marital status and
spouse’s income might be correlated with living close to parents or in-laws. Hence, we also check the
robustness of our results to the exclusion of these variables (see Table A.6 of the Appendix). Includ-
ing interaction terms for living close to parents or in-laws and education does not change results and
coefficients of these terms turn out to not be statistically significant.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckmann Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.020 (0.016) -0.348*** (0.044)
Other than German nationality -0.130* (0.078) -0.320** (0.138)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.296*** (0.015) 0.446*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.051*** (0.014) 0.071** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.051** (0.021) 0.083* (0.047)
Small community -0.032** (0.016) -0.012 (0.036)
Large community 0.057*** (0.018) 0.044 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.206*** (0.015) 0.319*** (0.035)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.016*** (0.005)
Children 0-3 -0.999*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.833*** (0.046) 0.060 (0.080)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection
Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96, 01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 of children
older than 3 living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town, far
from parents or in-laws. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies.
the probability of residing and working in the same town is around 12 percentage points
lower, and hence they are more likely to have to incur in costly commuting if their children
are regularly cared for by relatives. Table 2.6 displays marginal effects from the probit
estimation for the probability of working and residing in the same town, i.e. not having to
commute, for mothers in Germany age 25 to 50 with children of age three and younger.19
While having relatives caring for children on a regular basis increases chances of having
to commute, having children in a nursery on the other hand, does not significantly affect
the probability of being able to work and reside in the same town. On the other hand, the
19 Contrary to the effect of grandparent-provided child care on wages, the effect on commuting is
much more contemporaneous as commuting time in previous jobs should in principle not influence future
commuting time. Thus the effect on commuting could be measured using any of the two measures but
given data restriction we cannot provide results for commuting for our first sample. The question for
commuting was introduced in 1997 into the GSOEP and is thus not available for 2 out of 4 years of our
first sample.
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probability to be able to work and reside in the same town is higher for foreign mothers,
those living in large communities and those residing in East Germany, while it decreases
with marriage, and is lower for mothers living in small communities.20
Table 2.6: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation of Working and Residing in Same Town
Married, living together -0.113** (0.048)
Other than German nationality 0.517*** (0.098)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.012 (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.013 (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives -0.119*** (0.040)
Children in nursery -0.062 (0.045)
Small community -0.271*** (0.045)
Large community 0.260*** (0.053)
in East Germany 0.113** (0.051)
Observations 690
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Probit Estimation Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel, 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06; mothers 25-50 of children <= 3 years.
Reference Group: unmarried mothers of age 25-29 in 1997 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in a medium-sized
West German town, with children age 0-3 who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives. All regressions
include age group dummies and year dummies.
Individual Fixed Effects We also try to exploit the panel nature of this data set and
run individual fixed effect regressions. This allows us to control for unobservable individ-
ual heterogeneity (for instance in preferences for living close to one’s parents or in-laws)
which might be correlated with the outcome variables: having children or participating in
the labor market. To this end, we consider women in Germany aged 25 to 50 who stayed
in the sample from 1991 to 1996. Given the reduced size of the balanced sample we join
20Again results are consistent to the way age and education are included. Having a child in a nursery
may be correlated with child care by relatives. Hence, we also check the robustness of our results to
the exclusion of this variable ( see Table A.7 of the Appendix). Including interaction terms for having
relatives taking care of one’s children and education does not change results and coefficients of these
terms turn out to not be statistically significant. Similarly, one could look at the effect of child care by
relatives on commuting distance to work. However, in this case the coefficient for the variable ¨child care
by relative¨ turns out to be positive as expected but is not significantly different from zero.
16
the variables “parents or in-laws in same house” and “parents or in-laws close” into one
variable. As very few women become first-time mothers during the course of staying in
the sample, none of the coefficients in individual fixed effect regressions for fertility turn
out to be significant. Similarly, in individual fixed wage regressions the coefficient for the
variable “parents or in-laws close” is not significant. However, we can report significant
estimates for the probability of holding a regular part-or fulltime job (see Table 2.5).
Controlling for individual fixed effects, mothers living close to their parents or in-laws are
more likely to hold a regular part-or fulltime job. Coefficients of other control variables
of the individual fixed effect estimation are comparable to the marginal effects found for
the pooled sample (see Table 2.2). Marriage and the presence of small children negatively
affect mothers’ labor force participation.
Table 2.7: Grandparent-provided Child Care and Participation
Coefficients of Individual Fixed Effects Estimation
Regular Part or
Fulltime Job
Children 0-3 -2.009*** (0.435)
Married, living together -2.100** (0.862)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.025 (0.080)
Parents or in-laws close ‡ 1.277** (0.564)
Small community 0.129 (0.954)
Large community 0.152 (1.000)
in East Germany -14.422 (1,099.009)
Observations 328
Number of person. 164
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. ‡includes in same house.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Fixed Effect Estimation Data: (other nationality and educational category
omitted because of no within-group variance) GSOEP balanced panel 91-96
mothers 25-50 Reference group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 with education
level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in West Germany in a medium-sized town, living far
from their parents or in-laws, with children older than 3. All regressions
include age group dummies and year dummies.
While we find a positive relationship between grandparent-provided child care and fertil-
ity, and grandparent-provided child care and regular labor force participation by mothers,
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on the other hand, we observe that for mothers, grandparent-provided child care is re-
lated to lower wages and more commutes. From these opposing relationships a set of
interesting questions arise: What are the net effects of grandparent-provided child care
on aggregate employment and fertility? How valuable is grandparent-provided child care
in terms of fertility and employment? In order to answer these question, in the next
section we present our model economy that explicitly takes into account the spatial re-
strictions of grandparent-provided child care. Our goal is to account for the relationships
between grandparent-provided child care, fertility and labor market outcomes observed
in the data. Hence, we then calibrate our model to the German economy along sev-
eral key dimensions and highlight the model’s mechanism behind women’s decisions that
can potentially generate the observed relationships. Finally, we perform several counter-
factual experiments to analyze how women’s decisions change when public policy changes.
3 The Model
We have a model of fertility and employment choice in which individuals also decide where
to live. They choose between living close or far from their parents (or in-laws). Living
close provides access to free child care. We only model married women’s decisions and
even though marriage and joint residence choices may have an important impact on the
distance to ones’ parents we do not model a marriage market in order to keep the analysis
tractable.
The model economy is inhabited by a continuum of overlapping generations of married
women of mass one. Women live for five periods, two as children (0-9 years and 10-19
years), one as young fertile adults (20-29 years), one as fertile middle-aged adults (30-39
years) and one as old adults (40-49 years).21 Decisions in this economy are only taken
by adults. When they are young fertile adults, they decide where to reside - close to
their parents or far away -, how many children to have, and how much time to spend
working and how many resources to spend on their children’s education - in terms of
money and their own time. When they are fertile middle-aged adults they decide on how
many children to have, how much to work, and on how many resources in terms of money
and time to spend on educating their children. When old, adults decide on how much to
21Availability of free child care obviously depends on grandparents being able and willing to take care
of grandchildren. Even though individuals might still be working as old adults, we assume that close to
parents or in-laws there is some type of family network that takes care of children free of charge. We
also assume that there are no costs associated with taking care of grandchildren as, for now, we are only
concerned about the effects of spatially restricted free child care on mothers’ labor market outcomes
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work and on how many resources in terms of money and time to spend on educating their
children. There is also a government in this economy that taxes labor income at rate τ ,
and may provide family benefits T conditional on having children and/or conditional on
family income being below a certain threshold (T¯ ). The government may also subsidize
child care at rate ω. Individuals are born close to their parents so initially they reside in
’Home’, H. The region of residence of each individual is denoted by j, where j = H,F .
Regions There are two regions in this economy, ’Home’, H and ’Far’, F . Grandparent-
provided child care is only available in ’Home’.
Life-Course Offers At the beginning of their life as young fertile adults, individuals
receive two ’life-course offers’, one associated to living in ’Home’ and another ’life-course’
associated to living in ’Far’. A ’life-course offer’ is i) a realization of labor productivity xj
and ii) an exogenous source of income, zj representing a spouse’s income, where j = H,F .
There are N possible labor productivities and N possible exogenous incomes. Therefore,
for married women there are NxN possible offers for staying ’Home’ and NxN possible
offers for moving ’Far’. The probability that a married woman receives an offer (xH , zH)
in ’Home’ and an offer (xF , zF ) if she moves to ’Far’ is given by the matching matrix
Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ). A woman who receives an offer in ’Home’ where the labor productivity
is equal to x will receive an offer in ’Far’ where the labor productivity is equal to (1+κx′).
This implies that in case she receives the same productivity offer in both regions, she will
earn a wage premium in ’Far’, representing a larger labor market, where her exact same
skills can be matched better. However, productivity offers do not need to be the same,
they can be higher in ’Far’ xF > xH , equal in both regions xF = xH , or higher in ’Home’
xF < xH . Individuals are endowed with one unit of productive time.
Residence Choice Individual’s residence choice, D is a binary variable that takes on
value 0 if individuals reside close to their parents and 1 if their possible residence covers
the whole economy
D =
{
1 if j = F
0 if j = H.
Working Choice Individuals can decide on the extensive and intensive margin of their
labor force participation where l is the fraction of time they allocate to work. Individuals
thus have the following after-tax wage income, W
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W = (1− τ)xj(1 +Dκ)l,
where j = H,F , and κ > 0.
Children Individuals can have children when they are fertile. Children receive educa-
tion depending on the resources that the mother decides to spend on the child. We denote
by b the amount of money that an individual decides to spend on her children, and t is the
amount of time that she dedicates to take care of them. The time a child spends in child
care (tc) can enhance the child’s education. The child’s education function is denoted by
e = E(k, t, tc, b).
Child care Individuals with young children (0-9 years) who work require child care.
Hence, we assume that time spent in child care is equal to the time a mother is at work,
and thus tc equals l . The price of child care, p(D) depends on the individual’s residence
choice in the following way: p(0) = 0 and p(1) > 0. If the individual lives close to her
parents she obtains free child care, else she has to purchase child care at price p(1). The
individual might receive a subsidy ω from the government, thus actually paying (1−ω)p(1)
for each unit of time her child spends in child care.22 Mothers with children older than
9 years do not pay for child care independently of where they reside, given that these
children have access to a free public school.23
Utility Adults derive utility from consumption, children, and leisure. Let k be the
number of children an individual decides to have. The utility that individuals enjoy each
period is given by
U(c, 1− l, k, e) = u(c) + ul(1− l) + ue(k, e).
Children do not take any decisions but simply receive education.
Timing of Decisions When individuals become young fertile adults, they receive their
’life-course offers’ and they decide which one to realize, i.e. whether to reside close to
22We assume that this subsidy is only paid to those individuals who purchase child care at price p(1),
i.e. to those living in ’Far’.
23For now we assume that older children attend school during the time their mother works.
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their parents or not. After residence decisions have been taken, individuals have to decide
how many children to have, and how to split their time between working, taking care of
children, and leisure. Individuals move or not, they work the respective share of time,
and if they have children, they have to purchase child care if they work and live far away
from their parents. Individuals decide how many resources to devote to their children,
and they consume. From then on, they remain in the chosen region of residence.
Government The government in this economy collects labor income taxes τ , pays lump-
sum transfers T conditional on having children and having an income below a certain
threshold, T¯ , provides a child care subsidy, ω and consumes G. The budget constraint of
the government has to be balanced each period
(τ)Y = G+ P,
where Y is the total income of the economy and P is the amount of subsidies and transfers
that the government pays out to individuals.
3.1 Value functions
We start by defining the value functions of old adults. Old adults cannot have small
children but they might have older children born the previous period.
Old adult In the last period of individuals’ adults lives, residence decisions do not
change, but older children (10-19 years) born in the previous period, might still be present
in the household. Let km denote these children. Old adults thus have to decide how many
resources to spend on their children and how much to work. Old adults derive utility
from children, consumption, and leisure. The value of being an old individual living close
is given by
Ho(xH , zH) = max
l,t,b
U(c, , 1− l, km, e)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, km)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(km, t, tc, b).
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If the individual has children and her family income is below the threshold T¯ she might
receive some family benefits from the government, T . We denote by IT¯ the indicator
function that takes on value one if the family income is below the threshold, T¯ . The
indicator function Ik equals one if the individual has children. There are economies of
scale in consumption, Ψ(a, k), where a indicates the number of adults in the household and
thus is equal to 2 for a married couple. The optimal labor decision of an old individual
living close is denoted by LHo (x
H , zH). Optimal decisions in terms of money and time
devoted to children are denoted by BHo (x
H , zH) and THo (x
H , zH) respectively. Given that
only older children might be present in the household, old individuals living far away do
not have to purchase child care. The value of being an old individual living far is given
by
F o(xF , zF ) = max
l,t,b
U(c, 1− l, km, e)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, km)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(km, t, tc, b).
The optimal labor decision of an old individual living further away is denoted by LFo (x
F , zF ).
Optimal decisions in terms of money and time devoted to children are denoted byBFo (x
F , zF )
and T Fo (x
F , zF ) respectively.
Middle-aged adult Middle-aged adults have to decide how many children to have,
how much to work, and if they have children they have to decide how many resources in
terms of time and money to spend on the education of their children. Middle-aged adults
can have both small (km) and/or older (ky) children who were born the previous period
living in the household, k = km + ky. The value of being a middle-aged individual living
close is given by
Hm(xH , zH , ky) = max
l,t,b,km
U(c, k, e, 1− l) + βHo(xH , zH)
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, k)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(k, t, tc, b).
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Note that middle-aged fertile adults living at home have access to free child care as they
remain close to their parents. Thus, they spend an amount b of resources on their children
and during a fraction t of their available time they take care of their children. If they
work they leave their small children with their grandparents. The optimal labor decision
of a middle-aged individual living close is denoted by Lcm(x
H , zH). The optimal number
of small children is given by KHm (x
H , zH), optimal decisions in terms of money and time
devoted to all children are denoted by BHm(x
H , zH) and THm (x
H , zH) respectively. Given
that small children require child care while the mother works, individuals living far might
have to pay child care for their small children. The value of being a middle-aged individual
living far is given by
Fm(xF , zF , ky) = max
l,t,b,km
U(c, 1− l, k, e) + βF o(xF , zF )
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, k)c+ b+ (1− ω)p(1)Ikm
and the education production function
e = E(k, t, tc, b),
where Ikm is an indicator function that takes on value one if there are small children in
the household. A middle-aged fertile adult with small children living further away has to
purchase child care at price p(1) for each unit of time she decides to work. She has to
decide how to divide her time between work, l, taking care of her children, t, and leisure.
She also decides on how much to spend on the education of her children, b. Moreover, if
she works, she might also receive child care subsidies, ω per unit of time her children spend
in child care. The optimal labor decision of a middle-aged individual living further away
is denoted by LFm(x
F , zF ). The optimal number of small children is given by KFm(x
F , zF ),
optimal decisions in terms of money and time devoted to all children are denoted by
BFm(x
F , zF ) and T Fm(x
F , zF ) respectively.
Young fertile adult Young fertile adults have to decide which ’life-course offer’ to
accept, i.e. whether to stay close to their parents or not. If they stay they obtain free
child care. If they move they might be able to enjoy higher labor productivity and a higher
spouse’s income. However, if individuals have children they have to pay child care costs
per unit of time worked. Once they have decided where to live, they decide how much
to work and how many children to have and how many resources to spend on educating
their children. The value of being a young fertile woman remaining close to her parents
(D = 0) is given by
Hy(xH , zH) = max
l,t,b,ky
U(c, 1− l, ky, e) + βHm(xH , zH),
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subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xH l + zH) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, ky)c+ b
and the education production function
e = E(ky, t, tc, b).
The continuation value of living in region H is the value of being a middle-aged woman
living in region H, because residence decisions cannot be reconsidered. For a woman
living close to her parents the optimal decision regarding how much to work is denoted
by LHy (x
H , zH), the optimal number of children is given by KHy (x
H , zH). The optimal
amount of time spent taking care of her children is THy (x
H , zH) and the optimal amount
of money spent on her children is given by BHy (x
H , zH).
If the individual decides to move (D = 1), then the value of living further away is denoted
by
F y(xF , zF ) = max
l,t,b,ky
U(c, 1− l, ky, e) + βFm(xF , zF ),
subject to the following budget constraint
(1− τ)(xF (1 + κ)l + zF ) + TIT¯ Ik = Ψ(a, ky)c+ (1− ω)p(1)lIky + b
and the education production function
e = E(ky, t, tc, b).
Optimal decisions for a young fertile woman living further away are denoted by LFy (x
F , zF ),
KFy (x
F , zF ), T Fy (x
F , zF ) and, BFy (x
F , zF ).
Residence Decision Women have to decide whether to stay home or to move away.
They decide to move if the utility of living further away exceeds the utility of staying
close by, i.e.
D(xj, zj) =
{
1 if F y > Hy
0 otherwise.
where j = H,F .
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Equilibrium The optimal decision rules for fertile young adults are as follows: Ljy(x
j, zj)
is the labor force participation decision, Kjy(x
F , zF ) denotes the optimal number of chil-
dren, T jy (x
j, zj) denotes time spent with children, Bjy(x
j, zj) is the amount of money spent
on children and Cjy(x
j, zj) is the level of consumption, where j = H,F denotes the re-
gion where the individual resides. Optimal decisions for fertile middle-aged adults are
as follows: Ljm(x
j, zj) is the labor force participation decision, Kjm(x
F , zF ) denotes the
optimal number of small children, T jm(x
j, zj) denotes time spent with children, Bjm(x
j, zj)
is the amount of money spent on children and Cjm(x
j, zj) is the level of consumption, for
j = H,F . The optimal decision rules for old individuals are as follows: Ljo(x
j, zj) is the
labor force participation decision and Cjo(x
j, zj) is the level of consumption, T jo (x
j, zj)
denotes time spent with children, Bjo(x
j, zj) is the amount of money spent on children,
where j = H,F . Given a government policy (τ, T, T¯, ω,G), an initial matrix of ’life-course
offers’ Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ), a stationary equilibrium is a set of decision rules, a distribution
of residential choices, and the number of children born, K = Km +Ky such that
1. The decision rules are the solutions to the value functions.
2. The distribution of residential choices is consistent with the decisions.
3. The government budget is balanced.
4 Calibration Strategy
4.1 Functional Forms
In this part of the paper we present the explicit functional forms for the utility function
and the education production function. Individuals’ utility is separable in consumption,
children, and leisure. We assume log utility in consumption and in leisure, while the
utility in children’s quality is linear. There are two weighting parameters. The weighting
parameter for children is denoted by φe and the weighting parameter for leisure in the
utility function is φl. The weighting parameter for consumption is normalized to 1. The
utility of an individual is thus given by
U(c, e, k, l) = log(c) + φeQ(e, k) + φllog(1− l − t).
Individuals receive utility from the number of children in the household and from the level
of education that their children have received. Following Becker and Tomes [1976], we
assume that there is a trade-off between the number of children in the household and the
education that households can provide for their children which is represented by Q(e, k).
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To obtain this quantity-quality trade-off regarding children in the utility function, we
choose the following Cobb Douglas specification
Q(e, k) = eλk1−λ,
where λ denotes the share of education in the production function of a child’s quality.24
The education production function depends on a woman’s time spent taking care of her
children, t, the amount of money spent on the education of children, b and the form of
child care. Money and time are assumed to have a unit elasticity of substitution. The
share of time spent taking care of children in the education production function is equal
to θ. There are two types of child care: grandparent-provided child care and privately or
publicly provided child care. Grandparent-provided child care is only available to those
living close to their parents. We assume that both types of child care are equally produc-
tive in terms of education.25
If women live far away from their parents, money can be spent on children in two different
ways. If the mother works an amount of time, l her children have to spend that same
amount of time in private or public child care and she has to pay an hourly cost of
p(1). Private child care enhances children’s education. The other possible expenditure
on children is b, which represents any other type of expenditure related to children’s
education. A woman living close to her parents does not have to spend money on child
care. To her the price for child care is 0. Given that time spent with grandparents
is assumed to be as productive as time spent in private or public child care, leaving her
children with her parents while working is equivalent to investing in child care. The chosen
functional form to represent the relationship between expenditure in private child care
and other education related expenditure is of the CES type. The elasticity of substitution
between these two types of expenditures is equal to 1
(1−ρ) and the weight of expenditures
b is represented by α. This functional form is flexible enough to capture the degree of
substitutability between these two different types of expenditure. We thus specify the
functional form of the education production function as
e = ((α(b)ρ + (1− α)lρ) 1ρ )θt1−θ.
24Other papers in the literature use this specification; see for instance Greenwood et al [2000].
25However, this assumption can easily be relaxed.
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4.2 Parameters
Some parameters of the model are fixed based on available evidence. We calibrate the
model’s remaining parameters to match several labor market statistics of the German
economy as well as German data on fertility. Most statistics used for calibrating the
remaining parameters come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). For our
statistics we use pooled data from waves 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006. We consider weighted
statistics for married women age 20 to 50 born in Germany for whom information on par-
ents’ residence is available.26 Note that we will join the variables “parents or in-laws in
same house” and “parents or in-laws close” (see Section 2 for more details on this data).
Finally, we have a set of policy parameters which we will set such as to represent German
family policies.
In the model economy, there is an initial distribution of ’life-course offers’, Π(xH , zH , xF , zF ).
This matrix is chosen such that it be consistent with the existence of an initial distribu-
tion of young women’s labor productivities, Ω(x) and an initial distribution of men’s labor
productivities Θ(z). We assume a log normal distribution over productivity types and
we discretize the distribution to obtain different productivity levels, where the mean and
standard deviation are denoted by µx and σx respectively for women and µz and σz for
men. Women and men are matched according to the matching matrix Φ(x, z), where the
probability that a woman of productivity type x1 (being the lowest type) meets with a
man of the same productivity type, z1 is equal to ψ. We specify ten different productivity
types for women and we also have ten different types of exogenous incomes. There will
thus be a hundred different types of matches between a woman and an exogenous income
(spouse).
Parameters set a priori are the discount factor β, parameters related to the productivity
distribution over individuals µx, µz, σx, σz, and the assortative matching parameter, ψ.
Given that one model period is equivalent to 10 years, the discount factor, β is set to a
value of 0.675 in order to match a yearly interest rate of 4%. Estimates for mean and
standard deviation of the productivity distribution for women are taken from log-hourly
wages in our first pooled sample, which gives us the following parameter values, µx = 2.41
and σx = 0.47. Similarly for spouses we have µz = 2.66 and σz = 0.45. As we abstain from
modeling a marriage market we assign an exogenous income to each woman to represent
her spouse’s income. To this end, we use a matching matrix that assigns an exogenous in-
come to each woman based on information on who marries whom in the German economy.
26We consider only married women in the model and calibration as only 7% of single women are
mothers, while 76% of married women are mothers.
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In order to build this matrix we take the degree of assortative matching, i.e. how likely it
is to meet your own productivity type, ψ in Germany from Ferna´ndez et al. [2005]. The
authors calculate this value to be 0.7 in Germany, i.e. 70% of women match with men
of the exact same type, while the remaining 30% are equally likely to match with men of
types different from their own. Table 4.8 displays all parameters set a priori.
Table 4.8: Parameters based on a priori information
Parameter Explanation Value
β Discount Factor 0.675
µx mean log productivity of women 2.41
σx standard deviation of women’s log productivity 0.47
µz mean log productivity of spouses 2.66
σz standard deviation of spouses’ log productivity 0.45
n average working time of men 0.4
ψ assortative matching parameter 0.7
Parameters to be calibrated are the parameters of the utility function, φe, φl and the pa-
rameters of the education production function for children, λ, ρ, α, θ as well as the wage
premium of working in ’Far’, κ. Even though in a general equilibrium model all param-
eters affect all targets, we discuss briefly the data moments that each parameter is most
likely to determine. The weight of children’s quality in utility, φe is set to a value of 1.3,
such as to match the ratio of the fertility rate between women living close to their parents
or in-laws and those living far away, 1.02. The weight of leisure in the utility function, φl
is given a value of 1.15 in order to match a labor force participation rate of 56.82% for
married women in Germany. The share of the number of children in the quality-quantity
trade-off function, λ is set to 0.38 in order to match a fertility rate of married women in
Germany of 1.71.
Values for the three parameters of the education production function, ρ, α, θ are chosen
so as to match data on expenditure on children as percentage of average income, time
spent with children by parental working status, and mothers’ productivities. According
to the German Federal Office of Statistics, in 2003 families spent on average 500 euros
per month on each child. The average family income in Germany was 3,750 Euros per
month in 2003 (German FSO) and German households with children have on average
1.9 children. Therefore, the expenditure on children for an average household is close
to 10% of family income. The ratio of time that a non-working mother spends with her
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children in comparison to a working mother is 1.32. We calculate this ratio using data
provided in Ichino and Sanz de Galdeano [2004]. We take from Sayer et al. [2004] the time
high educated mothers (corresponding to the four most productive women in our model
economy) spend with their children as a percentage of their disposable time (16 hours
per day), 11.25% . 27 Hence parameters ρ, α, θ of the education production function are
assigned values 0.7, 0.6, and 0.35 respectively. The percentage of married women working
close, 54.54 is used to match the premium κ which takes the value of 0.05. Note that this
wage premium is very much in line with our empirical results (see Table 2.5). Table 4.9
displays the calibrated parameters of the model.
Table 4.9: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
φe weight of children 1.3
φl weight of leisure 1.15
λ share of education in Q function 0.38
α weight of b 0.7
ρ elasticity parameter between b and child care 0.6
θ share of expenditures 0.35
κ wage premium in ’Far’ 0.05
Finally, the model’s policy parameters are the income tax rate, τ , and the family policy in
terms of child care subsidies and family benefits, i.e. ω, T , and the threshold for eligibility
of family benefits T¯ respectively. All working individuals pay a proportional tax, τ on
labor income. We set τ to be equal to 37% which is equivalent to the income tax revenue
collected by the German government as a fraction of GDP (OECD [2010]). According to
the OECD [2009], all German families receive some family benefits for each child up to
the age of eighteen (Kindergeld). In particular, they receive 184 Euros per month for the
first child, 190 for the second and 205 for the third, fourth, fifth child etc. We set the
amount of family benefits in our economy, T such as to match the amount of Kindergeld
as a percentage of average family income received by a family with the average number
of children in Germany (1.9). Hence, T is set equal to 1.04. As all families receive this
27In the model economy productivity types refer to hourly wage rates. However, when comparing
productivity types in the model to data we use education types as proxies for productivity types, given
that we also want to consider women who decide not to work and for whom we do not observe wages.
The six lowest types represent 70% of the total population. This is equivalent to the share of individuals
who have less education than college or tertiary type of education in Germany
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help, the threshold IT¯ is not binding and T¯ = ∞. According to the same source, child
care subsidies are negligible in Germany and therefore, we set child care subsidies (ω) to
be equal to zero. For the cost of child care p(1), the OECD [2008] estimates that child
care costs in Germany amount to 9.1% of average income. Thus we set the price of child
care per hour such that child care costs in our model economy matches the average cost in
Germany. Hence p(1), takes on value 1. All policy parameters are displayed in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Policy Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
Calibrated
T Family Benefits 0.522
p(1) cost of child care 1
Set a priori
ω child care subsidy 0
T¯ eligibility threshold ∞
5 Results: Benchmark Economy
In Table 5.11 we present model moments of our benchmark economy together with the
corresponding data moments. We use data moments along several dimensions relevant to
the analysis of women’s fertility behavior, labor force participation and time and money
invested in the education of children.
We consider two moments related to fertility. The first one is the average fertility rate.
The second is the difference in average fertility rates between women who live close and
women who live far measured as a ratio. The average fertility rate in Germany among
women between 20 and 50 years of age is equal to 1.71. Meanwhile in our economy it is
slightly lower and equal to 1.24. Thus the model underestimates the fertility rate observed
in the German economy. In terms of the second fertility moment, the ratio of the average
fertility rate of women living close and the average fertility rate of women living far, the
model replicates the fact that this ratio is just larger than one. Thus women who live
close have a higher fertility rate than those who live far but the differences is small. The
ratio of average fertility rates is equal to 1.02 in the German economy while in our model
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Table 5.11: Data and Model Moments
Data Model
Average fertility rate 1.71 1.24
Difference in fertility rates close vs far 1.02 1.06
LFP rate of married women 56.82 49
LFP rate of married women close 58 54.52
Time spent with child non-working vs working mother 1.32 1.66
% of time spent by high educated mother 11.25 18.38
Expenditure on children as % of income 25 14.77
Child care costs as % of average income 9.1 10
Family benefits as % of income 10 10
this ratio is equal to 1.06.
We use two moments related to the participation of women in the labor market to match
the model to the data. The first one is the labor force participation of married women
and the second is the labor force participation of women who live close. In Germany,
56.82% of married women participate in the labor market. If women live close to their
parents or in-laws, their participation rate is higher, 58%. In the model economy, the
labor force participation of married women is 49%. Hence, our model underestimates la-
bor force participation (LFP) of married women by seven percentage points. The model
also underestimates the labor force participation of women who live close. The share of
married women who live close and participate in the labor market is equal to 54.52 in the
model. Nonetheless, the model replicates the fact that the labor force participation of
married women who live close is higher that the average participation. The mechanism
behind this observation is the access to free child care provided by grandparents if women
live close to them. Married women who decide to have children will have access to free
child care if they stay close. Thus their labor force participation rates are higher.
Now we consider the data moments that refer to the investment made by mothers in
terms of time and money. We consider two moments that show differences in terms of
time investment between mothers by education and by working status. According to Ger-
man data, non-working mothers spend an additional one third of time with their children
compared to working mothers. Our model over predicts this difference to be equal to two
thirds. Regarding the fraction of disposable time highly educated mothers spent look-
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ing after their children, our model also overestimates this number. In the data, German
mothers with tertiary education spend on average 108 minutes per day taking care of their
children. This represents 11% of their disposable time, while in the model, this percentage
is around 18%. We also consider monetary investment on children. The data moment
we use is the expenditure on children as a share of average family income. According to
the data, the average German family spends 25% of their income on children while in our
model this number is slightly lower and equal to 14.77%.
Finally, we also use the family benefits as a share of average family income available in
Germany and the expenditure on child care costs as a share of average income to match
our model to the German data. In Germany, families with children receive benefits equiv-
alent to 10% of their average income. Meanwhile, the cost of child care that they face is
equal to 9% of their average income. The model replicates perfectly the amount of family
benefits available in Germany and it also does a good job in replicating the cost of child
care.
On the whole the model does match the data even though it performs better along some
dimensions than others. However, we have targeted the model moments in Table 5.11 ex-
plicitly. In order to assess the validity of the model to carry out policy analysis, we need
to consider its performance in matching moments that have not been used to calibrate
the parameters of the model. The model produces several statistics and we are going to
concentrate on five statistics on the participation of women in the labor market. The first
one is the share of women who live away and participate in the labor market. The other
four statistics refer to the labor force participation of mothers by age of the mother and
where they reside. Table 5.12 shows these further data statistics and the corresponding
model moments.
In Germany, the labor force participation of married women living further away is equal
to 55%, while in our model this number is equal to 43.9%. Thus the model slightly un-
derestimates participation rates of married women living further away. Even though the
model underestimates the participation of married women living away, the model repli-
cates the observation that participation of married women living away is lower then the
participation of women living close.
The model also generates statistics on the participation rates of mothers. In particular,
we are interested in the participation rates of mothers with small children (in the model
, small children refers to children younger than 10). We argue that the main barrier for
participating in the labor market that women face when they move away is the high cost
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of child care. Child care costs are highest when children are young. Therefore we would
want our model to be consistent with the shares of working mothers with small children
in Germany. The participation rate of young mothers (between 20 and 29) with small
children who live close in Germany is equal to 31%, while the participation rate of young
mothers who live further away is equal to 24%. The model overestimates these two statis-
tics but the model generates the observation that young mothers with small children who
live far participate less in the labor market than those who live close. The observed labor
market participation rates in Germany of middle aged mothers (between 30 and 39) with
small children are higher than those of younger mothers, 46% for those who live close
and 39% for those who live further away. Even though the model overestimates labor
force participation rates of middle aged mothers, it generates the fact that middle aged
mothers work more than young mothers. The mechanism driving this result in the model
is that most middle aged mothers had a child from the previous period, thus it is more
expensive to have more children. This means that they need to work more than when
they were young. To summarize, even though the model overestimates labor force partic-
ipation rates of almost all groups of mothers of small children it generates the observed
differences in participation rates by distance to parents and by age profile.
In addition, our model also replicates well the share of women who move away from
parents or in-laws. While in the data, around 46% per cent of women live far away from
their parents (see Figure 1.2), in our model, almost 47% of women live far away from
parents or in-laws.
Table 5.12: Data and Model Moments: Not used for calibration
Data Model
LFP rate of women, away 43.9 55
LFP rate of married young mothers with small children, close 50.68 31
LFP rate of married young mothers with small children, far 31.71 24
LFP rate of married middle-aged mothers with small children, close 54.68 46
LFP rate of married middle-aged mothers with small children, far 39 43.9
share of female married population moving away 45.63 46.82
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6 Mechanisms at work: Who moves
In our model, young fertile women receive two different ’life-course offers’, one for living
in ’Home’ and another one for living in ’Far’. These offers include realizations of labor
productivities as well as an exogenous income, representing a spouse’s income. In ad-
dition, if women decide to have children they have access to free grandparent-provided
child care if they remain in ’Home’ while if they move away, they have to pay child care
costs for each hour that they work. Thus, when women decide whether to move or not
they face a trade-off between potentially better labor market opportunities and free child
care. If they receive a better labor productivity offer in ’Home’, there is no doubt that
they will stay. In case the offer is higher in Far, women who decide to not have children
will move, while among those who plan to have children only those who can afford to
pay for child care move. For instance, women who receive the same labor productivity
offer in ’Home’ and ’Far’ and thus receive a wage premium κ in ’Far’ only move if the
premium allows them to pay for child care costs. However, this is not the whole story, a
married woman’s exogenous income (spouse’s productivity type) also plays an important
role in her residence decision. Thus if a woman receives a high exogenous income she
might decide to move as child care costs are no longer a barrier.
In order to analyze who moves and who does not in our model economy we identify four
subgroups of women in our model: (i) low productivity type women married to low pro-
ductivity type men, (ii) low productivity type women married to high productivity type
men, (iii) high productivity type women married to low productivity type men, and (iv)
high productivity type women married to high productivity type men. In Table 6.13 we
display the share of women who move in the model and the data by these four sub-groups.
In our model low productivity individuals are identified as the six lowest types of the pro-
ductivity distribution while the high productivity individuals are the four highest types.28
The model does quite a good job in matching how many women remain close for the
subgroups mentioned above. We observe that 50% of married women belonging to the
high-low subgroup move, while in the data around 47% of them move. These statistics
are very similar for the low-high subgroup. The low-low subgroup is the one that dis-
plays the lowest mobility. In the model, around 41% of women belonging to the low-low
group move while in the data this share is close to 43%. On the contrary, the high-high
subgroup display the highest mobility both in the data, 52.77% and in the model, 52.34%.
28The six lowest types represent 70% of the total population. This is equivalent to the share of
individuals who have without tertiary education in Germany.
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Table 6.13: % of women moving away by type and husband’s type
Low productivity men High productivity men
data model data model
Low productivity women 43.24% 41.17% 47.65% 49.23%
High productivity women 47.19% 50% 52.77% 52.34%
We find that women work less if they live far away from their parents or in-laws, even
after controlling for education and wage of their spouses (see Table 2.2). Our model
replicates this fact as in both regions there are both high productivity women, equivalent
to high educated women, and low productivity women. And in both regions there are
women who are married to high productivity type men and also low productivity type
men. Those who belong to the low-low group are less mobile as child care costs constitute
an important barrier for them. Meanwhile, those who belong to the high-high subgroup
are the most mobile individuals. Child care costs are not binding for them. Thus, in the
presence of child care costs, the existence of free informal child care arrangements allows
especially mothers of low productivity to work. In absence of grandparents, their income
would be too low to pay for child care costs and therefore they would decide to not work
or not to have children. Meanwhile women who dispose of a relatively high exogenous
income are able to not work, stay home taking care of the children and enjoying leisure.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
First, we analyze a situation in which there are no grandparents available and everyone
has to pay for child care. Table 7.14 provides the moments for this counterfactual ex-
periment when there is no grandparent-provided child care available together with the
corresponding moments from our benchmark economy. Women face high child care costs
if they have children and want to work in the Far region. Therefore, the main reason for
not moving away is the access to free child care at Home. When women have no longer
access to a source of free child care at Home, the incentive to remain close is gone. Thus,
we observe that some women who were staying close to enjoy this free child care now
move away. This translates into an increase of 3 percentage points in the share of women
moving away with respect to the benchmark economy. The women who remain close are
the ones who either received a better ’life-course offer’ in ’Home’ or the ones who cannot
35
afford to pay for child care and thus they cannot participate in the labor market. As a
result of some women who previously worked moving away and facing child care costs,
the participation rate of mothers who remain close drops. At Home, only 9% of young
mothers with small children work and 31% of middle-aged mothers with small children
work. Meanwhile, the percentage of mothers living away who participate in the labor
market is higher than in our benchmark economy. Around 38% of young mothers living
further away work, while the percentage of working middle-aged mothers is 48. The rise
in the participation rates in Far is due to working women moving away to work for a
higher wage rate as they face the same child care costs in both regions.
We observe a decrease in the participation rate of mothers who remain close and an
increase in the labor force participation of mothers who move away. Looking at these
statistics, the net effect of non availability of grandparent provided child care is not clear.
We turn to what the effect of no grandparent provided child care is on women’s aggregate
labor market participation rate. The aggregate labor force participation of women drops
by 9 percentage points compared to the benchmark economy. The aggregate participation
of women is now 40%. Thus having no access to a free source of child care implies a drop
of 9 percentage points in the share of women who work.
Having no access to grandparent provided child care has effects on the average fertility
rate of the economy. We observe a slight decrease in the average fertility rate of women,
1.18 compared to the benchmark economy, 1.24. If women have to pay for child care,
children become more expensive, making women decide to have fewer children.
Table 7.14: No Grand-parent provided child care
No grandparents Benchmark economy
Fertility rate 1.18 1.24
Labor force participation of married women 40.01 49
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, close 9 50.68
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, far 38 31.71
LFP rate of middle mothers with small children, close 31 54.68
LFP rate of middle mothers with small children, far 48 39
share of population moving away 48.62 45.63
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In a second counterfactual experiment we consider a public policy meant to encourage
mothers’ labor force participation: child care subsidies. Child care subsidies are financed
through taxes. Therefore, child care subsidies might imply higher taxes. This policy is
government consumption neutral and thus the amount of tax revenues collected used for
government consumption remains the same as in our benchmark economy. We consider
subsidizing 50% of child care costs. Therefore, the policy parameter corresponding to
child care subsidies, ω is set equal to 0.5.
Table 7.15 displays moments from this counterfactual experiment, next to moments of our
benchmark economy without any child care subsidies. The percentage of women moving
away increases by 6 percentage points compared to our benchmark economy with no child
care subsidies. More women can now afford child care costs in ’Far’ and hence more
women decide to move. As a result, the percentage of mothers, both young and middle
aged, participating in the labor market in ’Home’ drops, while there is an increase in the
participation rate of mothers in ’Far’. However, the aggregate employment rate of women
does not change. Still 49% of married women participate in the labor market. This is
consistent with findings in the literature that argue that child care subsidies might not
affect maternal employment but simply induce a shift from informal child care to formal
child care, see Havnes and Mogstad [2011].
The aggregate fertility rate increases slightly under this policy. Women who move away
now face lower child care costs and so it is cheaper for them to have children while women
who remain close face zero costs of child care as before.
Table 7.15: Child care subsidized, ω = 0.5
ω = 0.5 Benchmark economy
Fertility rate 1.28 1.24
Labor force participation of married women 49 49
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, close 41.55 50.68
LFP rate of young mothers with small children, far 51.18 31.71
LFP rate of middle-aged mothers with small children, close 46.82 54.68
LFP rate of middle-aged mothers with children, far 53 39
share of population moving away 51.36 45.63
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we document benefits and costs of grandparent-provided child care. Looking
at German data we find that women residing close to parents or in-laws are more likely to
have children and mothers are more likely to hold a regular full-or part time job. However,
we find that their wages are lower and they are more likely to incur daily commutes.
We build a general equilibrium model of residence choice, fertility decisions, and female
labor force participation to account for this trade-off. We simulate the model to match
the German economy in terms of fertility, women’s labor force participation and other
dimensions related to time spent with children and expenditures made on children. We
then perform two counterfactual exercises to analyze the effect of grandparent-provided
child care and publicly provided child care on women’s decisions. We find that if there
is no grandparent-provided child care, there are fewer women participating in the labor
market. They cannot afford child care costs and hence they decide not to work. In
addition, fertility decreases. This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that
having access to free child care increases fertility. We also show that subsidizing 50% of
child care costs does not increase aggregate women’s employment rates with respect to
the benchmark case. However, there is an increase of 6 percentage points in the share
of women moving away and thus labor mobility is increased. In this sense it seems
that providing child care subsidies does not increase women’s labor market participation
but rather encourages labor mobility. However, in the absence of child care subsidies,
grandparent-provided child care plays an important role by allowing women to work.
In this paper we simply assumed that being close to one’s grandparents’ implies that
grandparents take care of their grandchildren and we do not consider grandparents’ de-
cisions to provide or not child care to their grandchildren. However, this decision might
be very related to individuals’ retirement age and especially in the case of grandmothers
to previous decisions about labor force participation. In this sense, opposing forces for
cohort effects of female labor force participation could arise. On the one hand, having a
mother who is actively participating in the labor force could increase chances for women
to also do so, while a negative effect could come from the fact that a grandmother actively
participating in the labor market might be less likely to provide child care for her grand-
child.29 We consider further analysis of how late first birth and improved health after
retirement might interact with these aspects a very interesting road for future research.
Another interesting path for future research could be to consider the macroeconomic ef-
fects of spatial restrictions imposed by grandparent-provided child care on optimal labor
mobility and the optimal allocation of talent.
29See Fernandez et al [2005] and Farre and Vella [2007] on the intergenerational transmission of attitude
towards the role of women in the economy and its effect on female labor force participation.
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A Appendix
Figure A-1: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Figure A-2: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
Figure A-3: Frequency of Care and Distance to Closest Grandchild Age 10 and Younger
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Data: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 2nd wave.
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Table A.1: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
with Interaction Terms
Married, living together 0.287*** (0.012) 0.287*** (0.012)
Other than German nationality 0.007 (0.027) 0.007 (0.027)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001)
in East Germany 0.152*** (0.008) 0.152*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.102*** (0.013)
Primary/Secondary edu (ISCED: 0-4) 0.102*** (0.013)
Parents or in-laws close 0.033*** (0.010) 0.064*** (0.016)
Parents in-laws close*Tert edu 0.031* (0.017)
Parents in-laws close*Non-Tert edu -0.033* (0.020)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Small community 0.029*** (0.010) 0.029*** (0.010)
Large community -0.060*** (0.012) -0.060*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732 10,732
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1 Data: GSOEP
unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference group:
unmarried women age 25-29 living in West Germany in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.2: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Fertility
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Having Children
without Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Marital Status and Income
of Spouse
Other than German nationality 0.030 (0.025)
in East Germany 0.140*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.089*** (0.010)
Parents or in-laws close 0.062*** (0.009)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.018 (0.012)
Small community 0.043*** (0.010)
Large community -0.089*** (0.012)
Observations 10,732
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; Women 25-50. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference
group: women age 25-29 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.3: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Participation
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation for Mothers’ Labor Force Participation without
Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: (1): Marital Status and Income of
Spouse and (2): Children in Nursery
Regular Part or Regular Part or
Fulltime Job Fulltime Job
(1) (2)
Children 0-3 -0.376*** (0.015)
Married, living together -0.052*** (0.020)
Other than German nationality -0.140*** (0.053) -0.072** (0.031)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.004* (0.002)
in East Germany 0.135*** (0.013) 0.127*** (0.020)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.169*** (0.013) 0.083*** (0.017)
Parents or in-laws close 0.024* (0.013)
Parents or in-laws in same house 0.026 (0.018)
Children cared for
by relatives 0.161*** (0.016)
Small community -0.009 (0.014) -0.013 (0.017)
Large community 0.023 (0.016) 0.032 (0.019)
Observations 8,129 3,390
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Probit
Estimation; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 1) 91,96,01,06; Mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers age
25-29 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized town in West Germany, far from parents
or in-laws with children older than 3. 2) 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06; mothers (25-50) of children <= 3. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4), in a medium-sized town in
West Germany, with children who are not cared for by relatives. All regressions include year dummies
and age group dummies.
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Table A.4: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Monthly Wages
Coefficients of Heckmann Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Monthly Wages
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Married, living together -0.047*** (0.017) -0.352*** (0.044)
Other than German nationality -0.111 (0.084) 0.320** (0.138)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.284*** (0.016) 0.445*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.058*** (0.015) 0.073** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.059*** (0.022) 0.084* (0.047)
Small community -0.029* (0.017) -0.012 (0.036)
Large community 0.063*** (0.019) 0.044 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.162*** (0.018) 0.320*** (0.035)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.017*** (0.005)
Children 0-3 -0.993*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.017*** (0.001)
Monthly hours worked 0.008*** (0.000)
Constant 5.693*** (0.052) 0.053 (0.080)
Observations 8,129 8,129
†Missing values and values < 1 are set to 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman
Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: unmarried mothers of age
25-29 of children older than 3 with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town,
far from parents or in-laws. All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies.
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Table A.5: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of OLS Estimation of Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages
Married, living together -0.006 (0.015)
Other than German nationality -0.112 (0.078)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.279*** (0.014)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Parents or in-laws close -0.055*** (0.014)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.055*** (0.020)
Small community -0.032** (0.016)
Large community 0.055*** (0.018)
in East Germany -0.224*** (0.014)
Constant 1.926*** (0.037)
Observations 4,348
R-squared 0.251
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS Estimation; Data:
GSOEP unbalanced panel 91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50 with full-or part time regular job.
All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies Reference group: unmarried
women age 25-29 living in West Germany, with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4),
in 1991, in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws.
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Table A.6: Effect of Close Presence of Grandparents on Hourly Wages
Coefficients of Heckmann Selection Model for Mothers’ Log Hourly Wages without
Variables Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Marital Status and Income of Spouse
Log hourly Selection
wage Equation
(1) (2)
Other than German nationality -0.132* (0.078) -0.353*** (0.137)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) 0.296*** (0.015) 0.436*** (0.036)
Parents or in-laws close -0.051*** (0.014) 0.059*** (0.032)
Parents or in-laws in same house -0.052** (0.021) 0.064 (0.047)
Small community -0.032** (0.016) -0.022 (0.036)
Large community 0.058*** (0.018) 0.057 (0.041)
in East Germany -0.204*** (0.015) 0.343*** (0.035)
Children 0-3 -1.006*** (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.016*** (0.001)
Constant 1.815*** (0.046) -0.088 (0.075)
Observations 8,129 8,129
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heckman Selection Model; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel
91,96,01,06; mothers 25-50. Reference group: mothers of age 25-29 of children older than 3 living in West Germany,
with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED: 0-4) in 1991, in a medium-sized West German town, far from parents or in-laws.
All regressions include age group dummies and year dummies.
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Table A.7: Effect of Grandparent-Provided Child Care on Commutes
Marginal Effects from Probit Estimation of Working and Residing in Same Town
without Variable Posing a Possible Endogeneity Problem: Children in Nursery
Married, living together -0.117** (0.048)
Other than German nationality 0.520*** (0.096)
Log (Spouse’s income)† 0.012 (0.008)
in East Germany 0.140*** (0.008)
Tertiary education (ISCED: 5,6) -0.020 (0.044)
Tenure in firm 0.004 (0.004)
Children cared for by relatives -0.118*** (0.040)
Small community -0.270*** (0.045)
Large community 0.261*** (0.053)
in East Germany 0.088* (0.047)
Observations 690
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Data: GSOEP unbalanced panel 97,99,00,01,02,03,05,06;
mothers 25-50 of children ≤ 3. All regressions include year dummies and age group dummies. Reference
group: unmarried mothers age 25-29 in 1997 living in West Germany with education level 1 or 2 (ISCED:0-4) in 1991,
in a medium-sized town, far from parents or in-laws, with children who are not in nursery, nor cared for by relatives.
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